In this study, we apply a new concept, corporate proximity to political power, to accounting research and examine its consequences on corporate financial reporting. Prior literature shows that higher proximity to political power leads to higher policy risk, i.e., uncertainty regarding the impact of future administration policies on the cash flow of the firm. An increase in policy risk implies an increase in the opaqueness of the information environment and in the expected volatility of future operating profitability; we argue that these effects both encourage and facilitate earnings management. Drawing on recent research in finance and political science, we use a measure of the alignment along party lines between politicians elected at the state level and the federally elected President as our main measure of proximity to political power. We find a significant positive association between the political alignment of firms' home states and their level of absolute discretionary accruals. Consistent with the idea that firms engage in corporate political activities (lobbying and financial contributions) to hedge against policy risk, our results only hold for firms not engaging in such activities.
Introduction
Does political geography, i.e. the dynamic evolution of the political map as it emerges from federal and state-level elections, matter for financial reporting? Changes in political geography result in exogenous shifts of firms' proximity to powerful politicians. Kim et al. (2012) and Pantzalis and Park (2014) showed that proximity to political power implies greater exposure to uncertainty about the impact of future policy initiatives on firms. Such policy risk can translate into higher cost of equity (Kim et al. 2012 ) and debt capital (Bradley et al. 2015) . 1 In this paper, we posit that, in addition to its potential cost of capital implications, exposure to policy risk can make firms' economic environment more volatile and less transparent, creating both incentives and opportunities for firms to engage in earnings management.
Our analysis introduces a metric of political geography to accounting research by adopting the measure of corporate proximity to political power proposed by Kim et al. (2012) which focuses on the political alignment of firms' home states with the federally elected president. We find that proximity to 1 Kim et al. (2012) provide evidence on the causal relationship between proximity to political power and risk, by regressing lagged changes in proximity on changes in systematic risk (ΔBeta) . They show that the coefficient of (ΔBeta) is positive and significant at the 1% level. Bradley et al. (2015) use the same measure of proximity to political power and find that it is negatively related to corporate bond ratings and positively related to firms' cost of debt.
political power is positively and significantly associated with earnings management, measured by the absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated using the Jones (1991) model as modified by Dechow et al. (1995) .
To corroborate the robustness of our results, we employ alternative proxies for both our dependent and independent variables and provide numerous other robustness analyses. The main results remain unchanged when using alternative discretionary accrual models (Jones 1991; Kothari et al. 2005) , taking into account exogenous business shocks (Owens et al. 2016) , including a more extensive set of control variables and estimating our main regression model in changes. In addition, following the approach proposed by Pincus and Rajgopal (2002) , we document that the observed earnings management efforts are partly driven by smoothing considerations. Based on ideology measures taken from Berry et al. (1998) , we also calculate two measures of ideological proximity to political power; using these metrics, the results are comparable to the ones obtained with our main measure of proximity to political power.
We furthermore investigate the relation between political geography and earnings management conditional on more direct types of political connectedness. We test whether firms actively pursuing political strategies via lobbying expenditures and contributions to political action committees are different from other firms (i.e., those not politically active but merely relying on passive political connections) when it comes to implications of proximity to political power. Consistent with the idea that actively pursuing corporate political strategies constitutes a hedge against policy risk stemming from exogenous variation in political geography (Bradley et al. 2015) , we find that earnings management is not significantly associated with proximity to political power for firms which engage in political strategies but is positively and significantly associated for firms that do not. Taken together, our results strongly suggest that political geography has effects on firms' financial reporting decisions and that more proximity to political power leads to more earnings management. We furthermore document that different forms of political connectedness have different effects on financial reporting outcomes and affect firms' reporting choices in a substitutive manner.
Our results contribute to the literature on the effects of political forces on financial reporting (Watts 1977; Watts and Zimmerman 1978) . In recent years, a number of studies have investigated the effects of corporate political connections on the strictness of accounting enforcement, audit quality and earnings quality (Batta et al. 2014; Bliss et al. 2011; Chaney et al. 2011; Correia 2014; Guedhami et al. 2014; Gul 2006) . Similarly to Chaney et al. (2011) , we use a discretionary-accruals-based measure of earnings management as our dependent variable. Our research goes beyond the existing literature by using a political-geography-based metric of corporate proximity to political power as our independent variable of interest. This measure, in essence, depicts a firm's indirect (or "passive") connectedness that arises from its location in the political map, and which captures the degree of potential exposure to policy risk (Kim et al. 2012) . In contrast to other more direct political connectedness proxies used in the accounting literature, ours has the double advantage of being fully exogenous to firms' own decisions and providing us with a large number of observations in the empirical tests. Additionally, it goes beyond the dichotomy of classifying firms as either politically connected or non-connected and accounts for both exposure to policy risk and indirect connectedness.
We furthermore contribute to research on the effects of geography on financial reporting.
Geographic proximity has been found to provide informational advantages (Choi et al. 2012; John et al. 2011 ). Shi et al. (2015) find that geographically dispersed firms engage in more real but less accrualsbased earnings management. Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) and DeFond et al. (2011) argue that closeness to a regional office of the Securities and Exchange Commission facilitates supervision by the latter and therefore leads to less reporting misbehavior and more conservative going concern opinions. While the effects of political geography have received attention in the finance literature over recent years (e.g., Faccio and Parsley 2009; Kostovetsky 2015; Pantzalis and Park 2014) , our study is the first to investigate its consequences for financial reporting.
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 introduces the research design. Section 4 describes our data. Section 5 presents our main empirical results and section 6 gives details on additional analyses. Finally, section 7 concludes. 4
Background and hypothesis development

Effects of political connectedness on firms' information environment
Over the past 30-40 years more and more firms are choosing to become politically active as a means to better compete in a business landscape that has become entangled with the political one. Politically connected firms have been found to differ from non-connected firms with respect to financial reporting characteristics. Corporate political connections exert an influence on accounting processes via more lenient enforcement (Correia 2014) , a lesser reliance of connected firms on the capital market due to better access to credit financing (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee 2006; Chaney et al. 2011) , protection from government expropriation (Batta et al. 2014) , effects on statutory audit (Guedhami et al. 2014; Gul 2006) and political costs due to higher visibility of connected firms (Ramanna and Roychowdhury 2010) , among others. While the literature on the effects of corporate political connections on financial reporting has grown reasonably broad, potentially differential effects of different forms of connections have not been investigated so far. In a study of the determinants of government bailouts, Duchin and Sosyura (2012) collect data on a broad range of connectedness measures, including geographic as well as financial links between firms and politicians. They find correlations between these measures to be low, indicating that they capture different aspects of political connectedness.
Political connections have ambiguous economic consequences for firms. A number of connectedness advantages have been identified in the literature, including a higher likelihood of being bailed out (Blau et al. 2013; Faccio et al. 2006) , better access to bank financing (Claessens et al. 2008; Li et al. 2008 ), a lower effective tax rate (Adhikari et al. 2006; Wu et al. 2012 ) and a higher chance of obtaining government procurement contracts (Goldman et al. 2013; Tahoun 2014) . At the same time, there is evidence that political connections serve corporate insiders at the detriment of outside investors. Tu et al. (2013) find that politically connected acquirers of privatized firms engage in tunneling. Yu and Yu (2011) find that firms that lobby evade fraud detection, on average, 117 days longer than other firms. Correia (2014) and Fulmer and Knill (2012) find that SEC enforcement tends to be more lenient on firms which contribute to political action committees. Firms' proximity to the political process may additionally expose them to higher policy risk (Bechtel and Füss 2010; Mattozzi 2008) or induce them to overinvest in order to electorally support the incumbent government (Bertrand et al. 2006; Wu et al. 2012) . In a systematic review of the literature on global corporate political activity, Rajwani and Liedong (2015) conclude that, in developed countries, studies find positive as well as negative effects of political connections on firms' operating and capital market performance. Hillman and Hitt (1999) describe corporate political activities as market-like processes where the political quid pro quo consists in politicians supplying public policy and firms providing the political exchange goods: money, information and votes.
Political quid pro quos are likely to depend on some level of secrecy and neither firms nor politicians trading favors are interested in much scrutiny (Ben-Nasr et al. 2015) . At the same time, the less strict enforcement of disclosure rules on connected firms facilitates a higher degree of opaqueness.
Corporate political connections therefore could lead to higher information uncertainty, defined in terms of the precision with which firm value can be estimated by knowledgeable investors at reasonable cost (Chen et al. 2013; Jiang et al. 2005) . Chen et al. (2010) accordingly show that financial analysts forecast earnings of connected firms less accurately than earnings of non-connected firms. Aabo et al. (2015) find that firms located in areas subject to more local political influence are associated with greater comovement with other local stocks and greater levels of excessive preference by local investors (i.e., local bias). Both measures are related to informational frictions in stock market (Barberis et al. 2005; Ivković and Weisbenner 2005) . In the accounting literature, political connections are generally found to be positively associated with measures of earnings management (Chaney et al. 2011; Ramanna and Roychowdhury 2010) . Connected firms have also been found to suppress the release of bad news before important political events (Piotroski et al. 2015) . They appear to pay higher audit fees than nonconnected firms, indicating that they are perceived more risky by auditors (Bliss et al. 2011; Gul 2006; Wahab et al. 2011) .
Political geography as a source of corporate political connectedness
The literature on corporate political connections has identified a number of different sources of corporate connectedness to politicians including, inter alia, financial contributions to election campaigns and lobbying expenditures (Correia 2014) , top management's past service in government or the military (Wu et al. 2012) and equity ownership by influential politicians (Faccio 2006; Tahoun 2014) . While most of these forms of connectedness result from deliberate corporate actions, firms can also be passively connected to politicians by the effects of political geography. Politicians have electoral motivations to care about the economic condition of their constituency and therefore have incentives to channel national funds to their voting districts (Cohen et al. 2011) . Consistent with this explanation, event studies have found negative capital-market reactions upon the news of the unexpected death of a politician for firms located in his or her home state (Faccio and Parsley 2009; Roberts 1990) . Studies on determinants of government bailouts during the 2008 financial crisis find that geographic political connections played a role in allocation of assistance under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (Duchin and Sosyura 2012; Kostovetsky 2015) . In addition to channeling financial funds to their home states, politicians may also lean on regulatory agencies to provide more lenient treatment to electorally important firms, e.g., those
employing a large workforce in their electoral district (Heese 2015) .
As is the case with other forms of corporate political connections, indirect connections via proximity to political power stemming from political geography have ambiguous effects. While firms enjoy the benefits described above, they may at the same time be exposed to higher policy risk. Veto player theory (e.g., Tsebelis 2002) argues that a government divided along partisan lines is generally less capable of implementing large policy changes. This implies that financial markets can operate under less policy risk than in times of unified governments (Bechtel and Füss 2008; Fowler 2006) . In a federal system such as the United States, a state government which is politically aligned with the federal president will be more likely to fully and quickly implement federal policies whereas states politically opposed to the president may attempt to veto or delay implementation. Consistent with this interpretation of political alignment leading to higher policy risk, Kim et al. (2012) find that political alignment of a firm's home state is significantly associated with higher returns. Pantzalis and Park (2014) show that the effect of geographic proximity to centers of political power is particularly strong in the presence of substantial corruption or dependence on government spending.
Hypotheses
The preceding discussion suggests that proximity to political power can have a detrimental effect on firms' information environment. It may increase information uncertainty which facilitates earnings management as investors are less able to see through it. At the same time, higher policy risk implies an increase in the expected volatility of future reported earnings. This would in turn lead to an increased risk of violating accounting-based covenants and to less smooth earnings figures being reported to investors. Both effects have been found to motivate earnings management (Dechow and Skinner 2000; Graham et al. 2005; Healy and Wahlen 1999; Schipper 1989) . We thus conclude that proximity to political power may both facilitate and encourage earnings management and state our main hypothesis as:
H1: Firms' proximity to political power is positively associated with earnings management.
We note that our argument does not rely on managers consciously taking politics into account when making decisions about accruals. Our argumentation only requires that managers become aware of the profitability consequences of increased policy risk which previous literature has shown to result from proximity to political power.
We are furthermore interested in the interaction of proximity to political power stemming from political geography, a form of indirect political connectedness, and other, direct forms of political connectedness emanating from firms actively pursuing corporate political strategies. There is little research on how these different political connections are related. Antia et al. (2013) argue that firms use political strategies to hedge policy risk and find that they adjust their lobbying expenditures in reaction to changes in political geography. Bradley et al. (2015) investigate the relation of proximity to political power and the cost of debt. They find no significant association for firms engaging in lobbying and/or contributing to PACs; for firms not engaging in such political strategies, they document a significantly positive association. Their results are consistent with the interpretation that firms successfully engage in corporate political strategies to hedge their exposure to policy risk. Based on these considerations, we posit that the effect of proximity to political power may be mitigated for firms lobbying and contributing to PACs and state our second hypothesis as:
H2:
The association between proximity to political power and earnings management is less pronounced for firms engaging in corporate political activities.
Research Design
Measuring proximity to political power
In our empirical tests, we focus on one particular setting in which effects of political geography lead to changes in firms' proximity to political power: the political alignment between the federally elected President and politicians elected on a state level along party lines. We use the political alignment index (PAI) developed by Kim et al. (2012) We furthermore corroborate our results using two measures of ideological proximity to political power, which are based on the ideology indexes developed by Berry et al. (1998; 2010 Park (2014), we use these measures to calculate an ideology alignment metric on the state level.
Specifically, we compute the absolute value of the distance between IDEO_CIT and the respective state government ideology (IDEO_GOV); we multiply this distance by negative one so that higher values represent a greater alignment of ideologies. We denote this measure as IPSG (ideological proximity to the state government).
3 Both IPFG and IPSG, similarly to PAI, capture the notion that political alignment facilitates policy change and hence leads to policy risk. Therefore, we expect that these variables are positively associated with earnings management.
Measuring earnings management
We measure earnings management by the absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABSDA), calculated using the Jones (1991) model as modified by Dechow et al. (1995) . We estimate the following model 
Relating proximity to political power and earnings management
We relate earnings management to proximity to political power using the following regression model:
ABSDA is our measure of earnings management and PAI is our measure of proximity to political power, calculated at the end of the fiscal year. We choose the control variables following prior literature (e.g., Francis et al. 2004 , Francis et al. 2008 . LNSIZE is the natural logarithm of market value of equity, calculated as the number of common shares outstanding (Compustat CSHO) times the stock price at the end of the fiscal year (Compustat PRCC_F). BM is the book-to-market ratio, calculated as the book value of equity (Compustat CEQ) divided by the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year. LEV is calculated as the ratio between total liabilities (Compustat LT) and total assets (Compustat AT). LNOC is the natural logarithm of the operating cycle, calculated as the sum of days accounts receivable and days inventory. 4 Following, for example, Bradley et al. (2015) , we include industry-, year-and state-fixed effects and present firm-clustered adjusted standard errors.
Dataset and summary statistics
Data
We obtain the data necessary to calculate the earnings management measures and the control variables from Compustat Annual and Compustat Quarterly. To measure proximity to political power, we use the dataset collected by Kim et al. (2012) . We do not include financial firms (SIC 6000-6999). In addition,
we exclude firm-year observations for which PAI is not available in Kim et al.'s (2012) Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the empirical analysis. ABSDA, our measure of earnings management, has a mean value of 0.1117 and a standard deviation of 0.1729. Our measure of proximity to political power, PAI, has a mean equal to 0.4617 and a standard deviation of 0.2316. Our average sample firm has a market value of equity approximately equal to $ 126.83 Million. The different levels of aggregation of ABSDA and PAI (where the former is measured at the firm-year level and the latter at the state-year level) are likely to bias the univariate correlations downwards and to explain the insignificant coefficients. In the multivariate analyses this problem is alleviated since we use state-and year-fixed effects (together with industry-fixed effects and other control variables).
Descriptive statistics and cross-correlations
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< Insert Table 3 about here > When separately focusing only on positive and negative discretionary accruals, respectively, the results are similar to those obtained from the pooled sample and seem to be stronger, in terms of both a higher magnitude of the coefficient and a higher significance level, in the case of negative discretionary accruals than in the case of positive discretionary accruals. 9 However, testing the differences between the coefficient on PAI in the regressions of column (2) and (3) Table 4 and they lend support to our interpretation of our main findings: changes in the political geography, which imply higher proximity to political power, lead to higher earnings management.
Main Empirical results
Proximity to political power and earnings management
< Insert Table 5 about here >
Corporate political strategies
In this section, we put hypothesis H2 to test by examining a subsample of companies that actively pursue corporate political strategies. To identify this subsample, we look at companies that either lobby or make contributions to PACs. The idea underlying these analyses is that companies that are politically active should have substantially lower incentives to manage earnings, as they are already partially hedged against risk stemming from proximity to political power. Thus, we expect the relation between earnings management and proximity to political power to be less pronounced for politically active firms than for firms that are not politically active.
The lobbying data we use is available from the CRP from 1998. Lobbying data are more comprehensive after the passage of the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) of 1995 that mandates lobbying registrants to file semi-annual reports with the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives. We only use our PAC data whenever we also have lobbying data available, as otherwise we could not be sure whether firms engaged in lobbying activities, even in cases where we know that they did not make PAC contributions. Hence, our analyses that are presented in this subsection are limited to firm-years between 1998 and 2008. In these analyses, our sample size reduces to 29,646 firmyear observations belonging to 5,141 distinct companies. We use the dummy variable POL_ACT that takes the value one in firm-years where a respective firm either lobbies or makes PAC contributions; it takes the value zero if the firm pursues neither of these potential courses of action and if we have information on both PAC contributions and lobbying activities. The descriptive statistics in Table 2 show that only ~15.98% of the 29,646 firm-years with PAC and lobbying data belong to firms actively pursuing political strategies.
Firms' decisions to engage in political activities are possibly affected by their home state's political alignment. We follow two distinct strategies to alleviate concerns related to a potential selection bias. First, following Bradley et al.'s (2015, p. 21 ) proceedings, we use a propensity score matching (PSM) procedure. For every state-year with enough observations for estimation, we estimate a probit regression of LNSIZE, BM and INDPOLACT (defined as the proportion of firms, in the same industry and fiscal year, which are politically active) on POL_ACT and match firms based on the propensity scores that result from this regression on a one-to-one basis. This procedure yields 4,413 firms that did as well as 4,413 firms that did not engage in political activities. 11 Using PSM to alleviate potential selfselection concerns comes with the advantage of having the same amount of observations available in both the treatment (POL_ACT = 1) and the control group (POL_ACT = 0); thus, PSM allows us to select two subsamples which are not only comparable in terms of the characteristics of the political activity choice but also not driven by the different sample sizes of firms engaging and not engaging in political activities. We report the PSM results in columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 .
Second, we also apply a two-stage Heckman (1979) model to counter potential criticism related to self-selection in our analyses of firms (not) engaging in political actions. We use the same selection equation that we also use for our PSM and report the results of the second-stage regression in columns (3) and (4) of Table 6. 12 < Insert Table 6 about here > Both using the Heckman model as well as PSM, we find that the relation between proximity to political power and earnings management is only significant for firms that are not politically active 11 We note that the PSM procedure, which matches firms on a one-to-one basis by state and fiscal year, leads to the loss of some observations for which data on political activity are available. The Heckman model, which we use as an alternative approach, uses all the observations for which data on political activity are available. 12 The coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio is omitted from columns (3) and (4). It is equal to 0.148 (t-value 4.52) for politically active firms and it is equal to -0.028 (t-value -1.80) for politically inactive firms.
(POL_ACT = 0). The coefficient on PAI is highly significant in columns (2) and (4) but insignificant in columns (1) and (3). Overall, the analysis in Table 6 confirms H2 by showing that the association between proximity to political power and earnings management is not statistically significant if firms actively pursue political strategies.
Additional analyses
In this section we present additional analyses and robustness checks to the main results presented in the preceding section.
Alternative specification of the main model
We consider an alternative specification of our main regression model in which we add further control variables. To further control for the effect of financial weaknesses on reporting incentives, we also repeat the analysis for profit firms and loss firms, separately. The results of the main (alternative) specification are reported in the first two (last three) columns of Table 7 .
In the alternative specification, additionally to LNSIZE, BM, LEV and LNOC, we include 12 Big 5 audit firms, calculated using data on the audit firm (Compustat AU) to control for the quality of auditing. Finally, we also add the antitakeover index developed by Bebchuk and Cohen (2003) 15 to further control for corporate governance effects on earnings management choices. The antitakeover index measures the antitakeover protections offered to firms by a state. It is defined so that it increases with the level of protection. The index is calculated at state-year level and we merge the data with our dataset using the index corresponding to the end of the fiscal year.
The results show that with all models and in all subsamples, inferences regarding the association between PAI and earnings management are unchanged. We note that that there is a significant loss of observations with the alternative specification; this is due to the availability of data on some of the additional control variables. 
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Corroborating the earnings management metric
To alleviate the concern that our results are driven by a particular specification of our discretionary accruals model, we replicate the main analysis using two alternative discretionary accrual models. First, we use the original Jones (1991) Furthermore, abnormal accruals models have been subject to frequent criticism in the literature (e.g., Dechow et al. 2010 , Owens et al. 2016 . One of the main points of criticism is that abnormal accruals are also affected by business shocks, and therefore may sometimes provide only a rough proxy of managerial discretion used in reporting accruals. In order to mitigate the concern on the inability of abnormal accrual models to distinguish the discretionary component of accruals from the effect of TA -NA. TA is total accruals, calculated as using the balance sheet method (see section 3); ∆REV is change in revenues (Compustat REVT); PPE is gross property, plant and equipment (Compustat PPEGT); ROA is obtained as net income before extraordinary items scaled by end of year total assets (Compustat AT). All variables, except ROA (which is calculated using year-end total assets, are scaled by beginning of year total assets (ASSETS, obtained as Compustat AT). 0.05). Excluding those observations leads to the loss of 12.23% of the sample; despite the reduction in the number of observations, the results, which are untabulated, are qualitatively similar to the main analysis (the coefficient on PAI is equal to 0.009, the corresponding t-value is 3.57). This suggests that our findings are not driven by business shocks which are unrelated to discretionary reporting choices and lends further credibility to our main results.
Proximity to political power and earnings management aimed at smoothing
One of the underlying objectives of the earnings-management effects that we document might be managers' desire to report smooth earnings (e.g., Ronen and Yaari 2008) . Trueman and Titman (1988) argue that uncertainty about firms' underlying operations gives rise to incentives for opportunistic income smoothing. To investigate whether proximity to political power is associated with earnings management aimed at smoothing we use the 'smoothing with discretionary accruals ratio' (SMR)
proposed by Pincus and Rajgopal (2002) . 18 We also consider a broader measure of earnings smoothing, which reflects both the discretionary and non-discretionary smoothing portion, which we denote as SMQ. 19 However, the focus of this robustness analysis is on SMR, because SMQ reflects both the nondiscretionary and the discretionary portion of smoothing, while SMR only focuses on the discretionary part. We repeat our main analysis, now using SMQ and SMR as dependent variables, respectively. The results are reported in Table 8 . For SMR, consistent with the results described above, the coefficient on PAI is positive and significantly different from zero; for SMQ, the coefficient on PAI is not significantly 18 Pincus and Rajgopal (2002) empirically test and find oil and gas firms to use abnormal accruals and hedging with derivatives as substitutes to manage earnings volatility (see also Barton 2001) . SMR is defined as follows: SMR = (NIBACQ)/ (NIBEQ), where σ refers to the standard deviation calculated over the fiscal year. NIBEQ is net income before extraordinary items (Compustat IBQ) scaled by prior quarter total assets (Compustat ATQ). NIBACQ stands for quarterly net income before extraordinary items and discretionary accruals, which is obtained as quarterly cash flow from operations plus quarterly nondiscretionary accruals. Quarterly cash flow from operations is obtained as quarterly net income before extraordinary items (Compustat IBQ) minus quarterly total accruals. Quarterly total accruals is calculated as: change in quarterly current assets (Compustat ACTQ) minus change in quarterly cash and short-term investments (Compustat CHEQ) minus change in quarterly current liabilities (Compustat LCTQ) plus change in quarterly debt included in current liabilities (Compustat DLCQ) plus quarterly depreciation and amortization expense (Compustat DPQ). All variables are scaled by beginning of quarter total assets (ASSETSQ, Compustat ATQ). Consistent with the analysis on annual level, to estimate the quarterly discretionary portion of accruals we use the Dechow et al. (1995) different from zero. These results lend support to the view that, as policy risk increases with proximity to political power, managers use discretionary accruals choices to smooth earnings. These findings shed more light on the association between earnings management and proximity to political power and suggest that it is partly driven by smoothing-motivated earnings management. Table 8 about here >
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Committee chairmanships
Observers of the federal policy-making process in the United States emphasize the role of Congressional committees and the importance of their chairmen's agenda-setting powers (e.g., Roberts 1990; Shepsle 1989 ). This agenda-setting power gives chairmen an important influence over the outcome of the legislative process (Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Walker 1977) . Cohen et al. (2011) find that chairmen of important committees earmark public spending for their home states, crowding out private investment. A change in chairmanship of an influential committee involving a politician from a given state may therefore have implications for firms from that state which are difficult to predict.
We obtain data on the composition of Congressional committees from Charles Stewart's website 20 and follow Stewart (2012) Information on committee members at the House and at the Senate is available at the website http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data_page.html. From the database we extract the following data regarding committee members: name, state, date of appointment and termination, party, role in the committee. 21 Specifically, for the Senate, the ten most influential committees are: Finance, Veterans Affairs, Appropriations, Rules, Armed Services, Foreign Relations, Intelligence, Judiciary, Budget, and Commerce. For the House, these committees are: Ways and Means, Appropriations, Energy and Commerce, Rules, International Relations, Armed Services, Intelligence, Judiciary, Homeland Security, and Transportation and Infrastructure. Our results are similar if we focus on the five or on the three most influential committees or consider all committees. 22 Our results are robust to changes on the definition of influential committee members. If we exclude all ranking minority members, e.g., we obtain very similar results. our main model on the relation between proximity to political power and earnings management for observations where CHAIRMEN is equal to one and zero separately. These results are reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 9 . In column (3) of Table 9 , we also interact CHAIRMEN with the other variables in the main model. Table 9 about here > The analysis in Table 9 indicates that the effect of PAI on earnings management is significantly stronger in states in which there has been a change in the number of holdings of influential chairmanships. This result is consistent with the interpretation that changes in influential committee chairmanships create additional risk for firms of the respective state which adds to the effect of political alignment.
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Effects of temporal distance to election
In this section, we examine whether the strength of the association between PAI and earnings management varies across time. Uncertainties about future policies are partly resolved by elections, which means that the effect of proximity to political power which we conjecture to affect earnings management via policy risk may vary over the electoral cycle. We therefore investigate the effect of PAI on earnings management during different parts of the electoral cycle. In particular, we investigate whether the effects of political alignment on earnings management are different in: election years; presidential election years; post-midterm-election years; individual years over the presidential election cycle; and short periods around presidential elections. To do this, we build a set of dummy variables that take value one when the end of the fiscal year corresponds to the above time periods and zero otherwise. For each period analyzed, we then include the dummy variable in our main model and we interact it with all the independent variables. We report the results of these tests in Table 10 , which also presents the coefficients obtained when estimating the main model in the single periods, separately. Our analysis shows some evidence that the effect of home state political alignment on firms' earnings management choices becomes stronger in periods preceding presidential elections and abates thereafter.
The association between earnings management and proximity to political power, as measured by the coefficient on the interaction term between PAI and the dummy for the period considered, tends to be stronger in periods before elections; however, the interaction term is significantly different from zero only in some of the periods considered. Table 10 about here >
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Proximity to political power and volatility of future operating profitability
To bring further support to the view that political alignment is connected to increased (policy) risk we tabulate analyses that relate political alignment to the volatility of firms' future operating profitability in Table 11 . We measure volatility of future operating profitability by the standard deviation, calculated over the next three fiscal years, of cash flow from operations, scaled by prior year total assets. We regress PAI, the control variables used in the main model (LNSIZE, BM, LEV and LNOC) as well as further control variables similar to Subramanyam (1996) 23 on volatility of future operating profitability. The coefficient on PAI is positive (0.004) and significantly different from zero (t-value: 2.76). This result supports the view that PAI induces policy risk and that higher levels of political alignment imply a higher volatility of operating profitability in the future. Table 11 about here >
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Model in changes
We estimate our main model (that is presented in column (1) of Table 4 ) in changes, where both the dependent variable and the independent variables are the changes from year -1 to . The results are untabulated. In this regression, the coefficient on the change in PAI is positive (0.011) and highly significant (t-value: 3.32). These findings provide further support for the documented positive association between proximity to political power and earnings management.
Tests of the informativeness of earnings management
We investigate the informativeness of earnings management associated with PAI by examining whether the predictive ability of discretionary accruals with respect to future operating profitability is related to PAI. Specifically, following Subramanyam (1996) , we regress future cash flow from operations or net income before extraordinary items (in the first, second and third year after the current fiscal year) on current discretionary accruals (as well as current non-discretionary accruals and current cash flows from operations) and we interact all explanatory variables with PAI. The results are untabulated. 24 Similar to Subramanyam (1996) , we find that the coefficient on discretionary accruals is positive and highly significant. However, the coefficient on the interaction term of discretionary accruals and PAI is not significantly different from zero in five out of six models; it is significantly (at the 10%) different from zero (and negative) only when using cash flow from operations in the following year as the dependent variable. The results on these interaction term suggest that earnings management associated with PAI is neither more nor less informative than other earnings management choices.
Conclusions
In this paper we examine whether exogenously determined corporate proximity to political power, as reflected in political alignment between politicians of a firm's home state and politicians on the federal level, has an influence on corporate earnings management. Prior research has argued that such political alignment increases policy risk by diminishing gridlock which prevents policy change (Kim et al. 2012 ).
This creates additional uncertainty in a firm's information environment, which both encourages and facilitates earnings management. We test this argument by investigating the relation between a measure of political alignment and the absolute level of firms' discretionary accruals, our measure of earnings management. The analysis covers 120,123 firm-year observations from 11,038 distinct firms from all U.S. states over the 1966 to 2008 period. 24 Following Subramanyam (1996) , we estimate the following model: OP + = β 0 + β 1 CFO + β 2 NDA + β 3 DA + β 4 PAI + β 5 CFO × PAI + β 6 NDA × PAI + β 7 DA × PAI + where CFO is cash flow from operations, scaled by prior year total assets; NDA is non-discretionary accruals; DA is discretionary accruals; OP is a measure of operating profitability (either net income before extraordinary items or cash flow from operations), scaled by prior year total assets. We estimated the model for k = 1, 2, 3. In all the models β 3 is positive and significantly different from zero. β 7 is significantly different from zero (it is negative and significant and the 10% level) only for k = 1 and OP = CFO.
Our results indicate a positive association between proximity to political power and earnings management. We furthermore find that this association only holds for firms which do not engage in lobbying or make financial contributions to PACs. Prior research has shown that firms use such political strategies as a hedge against policy risks (e.g., Kim et al. 2014) . In line with these earlier findings, we conclude that our results are indeed driven by the higher policy risk in politically aligned states. We furthermore document a similar effect using a measure of ideological alignment between a state's citizens and respectively their state's government and the federal president.
Our results are related to Chaney et al.'s (2011) findings that firms whose owners or top directors are themselves politicians or are tightly related to high-ranking politicians have significantly poorer earnings quality. They argue that these firms can afford lower earnings quality since they have privileged access to finance and are therefore less subject to capital-market pressures. Such advantages predominantly occur in institutionally less developed countries where political connections compensate for weak public institutions (Claessens et al. 2008; Li et al. 2008) . Prior evidence from the U.S. suggests that in this country rent-seeking from personal connections to politicians is impeded by strong institutions (Fisman et al. 2012 ). Our evidence identifies a different channel through which the proximity to political power created by firms' home states' political alignment has a detrimental effect on their reporting quality: it affects managers' reporting incentives via its effect on policy risk-even in an institutionally strong environment like the U.S.
The findings of this study suggest that political geography plays a role in explaining financial reporting outcomes also within a single country representing a homogenous institutional environment Berry et al.'s (1998) citizen ideology index multiplied with a dummy variable that becomes one for time periods with a Democrat President.
IPFG
IPSG
The absolute value of the difference between Berry et al.'s (1998 Berry et al.'s ( ) revised 1960 Berry et al.'s ( -2013 citizen ideology series and the ADA/COPE measure of state government ideology (also from Berry et al., 1998) Bradley et al. (2015) . POL_ACT becomes one if a company engaged in lobbying or made PAC contributions and if we are able to observe both lobbying and PAC contributions. As the lobbying data are only available from 1998 to 2008, the analyses using POL_ACT are limited to this time period as well.
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1%-level. BM is the book value of equity over the market value of equity. LEV is total liabilities over equity. LNOC is the natural logarithm of the operating cycle. LNSIZE is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. PAI is our measure of proximity to political power; PAI is missing if the geographic location of the firm at the end of the fiscal year cannot be identified using Compustat and Compact Disclosure (see Section 4.1). POL_ACT is our proxy for active corporate political strategies. SIC is the abbreviation for the Standard Industrial Classification code. More detailed variable descriptions are listed in Appendix A. ABSDA is the absolute value of discretionary accruals which we estimated using the modified Jones model introduced by Dechow et al. (1995) . BM is the book value of equity over the market value of equity. CFO is used as our proxy for operating profitability and calculated as income before extraordinary items minus total accruals. IPFG is our measure of ideological proximity to the federal government. IPSG is our measure of ideological proximity to the state government. LEV is total liabilities over equity. LNOC is the natural logarithm of the operating cycle. LNSIZE is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. PAI is our measure of proximity to political power. POL_ACT is our proxy for active corporate political strategies. SIC is the abbreviation for the Standard Industrial Classification code. More detailed variable descriptions are listed in Appendix A. Under the diagonal of the correlation matrix (which is highlighted for better visibility) pairwise Pearson correlations are depicted, above the diagonal Spearman correlations are to be found.
Appendix B: Tables
ABSDA is the absolute value of discretionary accruals which we estimated using the modified Jones model introduced by Dechow et al. (1995) . BM is the book value of equity over the market value of equity. CFO is used as our proxy for operating profitability and calculated as income before extraordinary items minus total accruals. IPFG is our measure of ideological proximity to the federal government. IPSG is our measure of ideological proximity to the state government. LEV is total liabilities over equity. LNOC is the natural logarithm of the operating cycle. LNSIZE is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. PAI is our measure of proximity to political power. POL_ACT is our proxy for active corporate political strategies. SIC is the abbreviation for the Standard Industrial Classification code. More detailed variable descriptions are listed in Appendix A. In all regressions presented in this table, the dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals. To estimate discretionary accruals, we use the modified Jones model introduced by Dechow et al. (1995) . All regression models are estimated with industry-, year-and state-fixed effects and with standard errors that are clustered by firm. The regression F-test (untabulated) is significant at the 1% level in all the models.
In regressions (2) and (3), we estimate the regression model established in regression (1) separately for firms with positive and negative discretionary accruals. Here, 'upwards EM' stands for the analyses on firms having positive discretionary accruals, while 'downwards EM' stands for the analyses on firms having negative discretionary accruals.
PAI is our measure of proximity to political power. LNSIZE is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. BM is the book value of equity over the market value of equity. LEV is total liabilities over equity. LNOC is the natural logarithm of the operating cycle. More detailed variable descriptions are listed in Appendix A. In all regressions presented in this table, the dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals. To estimate discretionary accruals, we use the modified Jones model introduced by Dechow et al. (1995) . All regression models are estimated with industry-, year-and state-fixed effects and with standard errors that are clustered by firm. The regression F-test (untabulated) is significant at the 1% level in all the models.
Our main independent variables in the above analyses are: (1) IPFG, i.e., our measure of ideological proximity to the federal government; (2) IPSG, i.e., our measure of ideological proximity to the state government. The coefficients on IPFS and IPSG have been multiplied by 10.
LNSIZE is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. BM is the book value of equity over the market value of equity. LEV is total liabilities over equity. LNOC is the natural logarithm of the operating cycle. More detailed variable descriptions are listed in Appendix A. In all regressions presented in this table, the dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals. To estimate discretionary accruals, we use the modified Jones model introduced by Dechow et al. (1995) . All regression models are estimated with industry-, year-and state-fixed effects and standard errors are clustered by firm. In regressions (1) and (2), we compare firms with active political strategies (POL_ACT = 1) to all firms that did not have political action committees or engage in lobbying (POL_ACT = 0). To make sure that our inferences are not driven by the group of firms that did not engage in political actions having much more observations than the group of firms engaging in political actions and to correct for a possible selection bias, we use propensity score matching in regressions (1) and (2). It is conducted on a one-to-one basis by estimating the effect of LNSIZE, BM and INDPOLACT (the proportion of firms, in the same industry and fiscal year, which are politically active) on POL_ACT in a probit regression (similar to Bradley et al., 2015) . To correct for a possible selection bias in a different way, we report the results of the second stage of the estimation of the Heckman (1979) model in columns (3) and (4). In the first stage, we use LNSIZE, BM and INDPOLACT again as variables for our selection equation to explain POL_ACT. In presenting these results, the coefficient on the inverse Mills Ratios is omitted. The regression F-test (untabulated) is significant at the 1% level in all the models.
POL_ACT is our proxy for active corporate political strategies. It is a coded as a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm has a political action committee, engages in lobbying, or does both, and 0 otherwise. To determine if a company actively carries out political strategies, we only considered those firm-years where we had both data on political action committees and lobbying. In the above regressions (1) and (2), the dependent variables are two smoothing ratios -SMR and SMQ -respectively. They are used instead of the absolute value of discretionary accruals as dependent variables to test the association of proximity to political power and earnings management aimed at smoothing. Both regressions are estimated with industry-, year-and state-fixed effects and with standard errors that are clustered by firm. The regression F-test (untabulated) is significant at the 1% level in all the models.
We calculate earnings management aimed at smoothing using two different ratios -SMR and SMQ. SMR is the standard deviation of a firm's quarterly income before abnormal accruals and extraordinary items (estimated separately for each industry quarter) over the standard deviation of its quarterly income before extraordinary items. SMR is based on the smoothing metric used in Pincus & Rajgopal (2002) . SMQ is the standard deviation of a firm's quarterly cash flows of operations over the standard deviation of its quarterly income before extraordinary items. In all regressions and for all regression coefficients presented in this table, the dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals. To estimate discretionary accruals, we use the modified Jones model introduced by Dechow et al. (1995) . In the third column, we present the coefficient on PAI of our main regression model (ABSDA = 0 + 1 PAI + CONTROLS + FIXED EFFECTS + ) estimated for the subsamples indicated in the second column; in the fourth and fifth columns we present the corresponding number of observations and the adjusted R 2 . The subsamples are determined using dummy variables (TIME_DUMMY) that classify firms' fiscal years (based on the end of the fiscal year) into specific time periods within the electoral cycle. To test the statistical significance of these coefficient differences, we use an interaction regression (ABSDA = 0 + 1 PAI + 2 TIME_DUMMY + 3 PAI × TIME_DUMMY + (INTERACTED) CONTROLS + (INTERACTED) FIXED EFFECTS + ), which is run by using all the 120,123 in our main 
